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DISCRETIONARY (IN)JUSTICE: THE EXERCISE OF
DISCRETION IN CLAIMS FOR ASYLUM

Kate Aschenbrenner*

Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that asylum may
be granted to an applicant who meets the definition of a refugee-that is, someone
who has been persecuted or has a wellfounded fear of future persecution in her
own country on account of race, religion, nationality, political apinion, or membership in a particular social group. Asylum is a discretionary form of relief, which
means that the United States gvvemment is not required to grant asylum to every
refugee within the United States but instead may decide whether or not to do so.
This Article sets out in Part I the history and current application of discretion as
an element of asylum adjudications, including several case studies to illustrate
when and how adjudicators deny asylum in an exercise of discretion and the serious impact of those decisions. Part II then argues that the fact that asylum is
discretionary is highly problematic. First, discretion is unnecessary to achieve the
purported goals of such a policy, namely, screening individuals for their suitability
to become permanent members of the United States community. Second, the fact
that as,vlum is discretionary results in inadequate protection for those fleeing persecution. Finally, the meaning of the term "discretion" is so inherently vague and
confused as to make its use inappropriate, at least in the asylum context. This Article concludes that asylum should be a mandatory, not a discretionary, form of
immigration relief. An adjudicator's exercise of discretion in asylum claims should
be eliminated, or at least substantially limited with an eye towards the problems
discussed herein.

INTRODUCTION

Offering refuge to those who are fleeing persecution in other
nations has historically been asserted as part of the national identi1
ty of the United States. It is not surprising, then, that a Russian Jew
Assistant Professor, Immigration Clinic, Barry University School of Law, Orlando,
*
Florida; J.D., cum laude, New York University; B.A., magna cum laude with honors, Knox
College. The author expresses her thanks and gratitude to Jamie Juster-Caballero for her
outstanding research and citation support and to Sarah Al-Shawwaf for her dedication and
compassion. In honor of"Celine."
1.
One prominent example is the line from Emma Lazarus' poem, The New Colossus,
inscribed on a plaque in the Statue of Liberty:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, ...
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
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who was harassed, threatened, arrested, and detained; whose
daughter was kidnapped twice; and whose wife was purposefully
injured in a serious car accident; all because the family was Jewish,
would apply for protection in the United States and be found by an
immigration judge to have a well-founded fear of returning to Russia. 2 It would be somewhat more surprising, if not shocking, to
learn that this same man, Nikolai Kouljinski, was not granted asylum and was instead ordered removed to Russia, the very country
where he feared persecution, despite being found fully statutorily
eligible for asylum. In fact, that is exactly what happened. 3 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an immigration judge's
decision to deny Mr. Kouljinski asylum in an exercise of discretion
based primarily on two factors: Mr. Kouljinski's three convictions
for driving under the influence, the most recent six years prior to
issuance of the court's decision, and his lack of family ties in the
4
United States.
This same outcome is possible in every single asylum claim
heard in the United States. Section 208(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act provides that the Attorney General or the Secretary
of Homeland Security may grant asylum to an applicant who meets
the definition of a refugee-that is, one who has been persecuted
or has a well-founded fear of future persecution in his or her own
country on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership in a particular social group. 5 Particular import has
been given to the word "may" in this section of the law. It means
that the United States government is not required to grant asylum
to a refugee within the United States; instead, the designated offi6
cial has discretion to decide whether to do so. This Article focuses

Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), reprinted in 1 THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 202-03
(1899). It is worth noting, however, that the perception of the United States as a haven for
refugees and other forced migrants has throughout much of U.S. history been more of an
idealized vision than a factual reality. See, e.g., PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR:
THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE POLITICAL AsYLUM IN AMERICA 17 (2000) ("For much
of American history, with the exception of a brief, remarkable thaw from 1965 to 1990, lawmakers imposed ever-increasing limitations on immigration into the United States. Some of
the restrictions ... had a devastating effect on people who had been forced by the threat of
persecution to flee their native lands.").
2.
These facts, and the following facts in this paragraph, are drawn from Kouljinski v.
Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2007).
3.
Id. at 54Q-41.
4.
Id. at 543. Mr. Kouljinski was also denied withholding of removal because he did
not meet the necessary higher standard of proof. Id. at 545.
5.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(2006); INA§ 101 (a)(42) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2006).
6.
See infra Part 1-B.
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on when, how, and why this discretion is exercised, and the problems inherent in its use.
This Article first sets out in Part I the history and current application of discretion as an element of asylum adjudications. Part I
will also discuss several case studies to illustrate when and how adjudicators deny asylum in an exercise of discretion and the serious
impact of those decisions. Part II will then argue that asylum as discretionary relief is highly problematic for a number of reasons.
The first two reasons focus on the asylum context, while a third is
grounded in and applicable to immigration law and the practice of
administrative law more generally.
First, making asylum discretionary is unnecessary to achieve the
purported goals of such a policy. One reason often given to justify
discretion as an element in addition to the substantive requirements for asylum is that, when receiving asylum, an individual is
invited to become a permanent and vested member of the United
7
States community. However, discretion at the asylum stage is not
necessary to achieve this purpose. The most significant factors that
have been developed as relevant to an adjudicator's discretionary
determination are explicitly taken into consideration during later
parts of the process of becoming a United States citizen. Second,
the fact that asylum is discretionary results in inadequate protection for those fleeing persecution. Individuals like Mr. Kouljinski
are sent back to face the very harm they fled to escape, and even
individuals who are granted some lesser form of fear-based relief
from removal face such significantly restricted rights and opportunities that their relief is insufficient. Finally, the meaning of the
term "discretion" is so inherently vague and confused as to make
its use inappropriate, at least in the asylum context.
This Article concludes that asylum should be a mandatory, not a
discretionary, form of immigration relief. An adjudicator's exercise
of discretion should be eliminated, or at least substantially limited
with an eye towards the problems discussed here, as an element in
asylum claims.

7.
See, e.g., Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 314-15 (BIA 1982); see also Deborah E. Anker,
Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 16-17 (1987). Administrative adjudications will be cited in this Article according
to Bluebook Rule 14.3.l(a), which provides that case names of administrative adjudications
should be cited without procedural phrases.
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. The Fact That Asylum Is Discretionary Is More
Than a Theoretical Problem

Several courts of appeals have described discretionary denials of
8
asylum claims as rare, and a quick glance through the more recent
published decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
would suggest that discretionary denials survive administrative review only in the cases with exceptionally negative discretionary
factors. 9 It would be a mistake to conclude on this basis, however,
that discretionary denials are an insignificant issue.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the percentage of
asylum cases decided on the basis of discretion with existing public
information. While both agencies responsible for asylum claims,
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), keep statistics on their asylum grant and denial rates (as well as referral rates
for USCIS), neither appears to separate their denial statistics by the
10
particular grounds for the denial. Because neither asylum officer
nor immigration judge decisions are publicly available, an inde11
pendent statistical analysis cannot be conducted. It is highly likely,
then, that the circuit courts are overstating the rarity of discretionary denials. Because there is no other source of information
8.
See, e.g., Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 2008); Gulla v. Gonzales, 498
F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2007); Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2006); Kalubi v.
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2004). See also, e.g., 3 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN, AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 34.02(12)(d)
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011) (stating, without citation, that "denials of asylum on discretionary grounds have been rare").
9.
See, e.g., A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774 (AG 2005) (denying asylum in the exercise of
discretion to the leader of an organization with ties to armed Islamist groups known to engage in acts of persecution and terrorism).
10.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE AsYLUM \\'ORKLOAD
FROM USCIS AsYLUM DIVISION QUARTERLY STAKEHOLDER MEETING (2010), available at http:
/ /www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/National%
20Engagement% 20Pages/2010%20Events/ October%202010I Affirmative% 20Asylum %20W
orkload%20-%20May%20-%20Sept%202010.pdf; EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK 1-L (2011), available at http:/ /www.
justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fylOsyb.pdf. Indeed, such separation would be extremely difficult,
given that adjudicators often give multiple, sometimes intertwined, grounds for their decisions.
For analyses of other statistics related to asylum (and other immigration) cases, see
11.
]AYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ, AND PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE RouLETTE: DISPARITIES IN AsYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2009) and the
Immigration Reports created by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC).
See, e.g., Immigration Reports, TRAC, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011).
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available to them, they must be basing their conclusions on the
number of published BIA and federal cases. These cases represent
only a small proportion of the asylum claims handled by the Unit12
ed States government each year, and, particularly before the BIA,
tend to have extreme facts that lend themselves to setting precedent.
Furthermore, the following case studies illustrate that discretionary denials of asylum have such a significant impact on
individual asylum seekers that, even if the number of individuals
affected is proportionally small, this is nevertheless an important
issue. The case studies discussed below are drawn from actual cases, but the names and other identifying details have been changed
to protect the identity and privacy of the individuals concerned.
Their stories demonstrate many of the issues surrounding discretionary denials of asylum, including the profound and far-reaching
impact of a discretionary denial on the individual, the inadequacy
of alternative forms of protection, and the indeterminate and contradictory nature of the discretionary standard.

1. Case Study Number One: Celine
13

Celine fled to the United States after suffering horrific persecution spanning many years in her native Rwanda. Her problems
began with the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Celine and her family
were Tutsi, the minority ethnicity targeted during the 1994 genocide. Celine and one of her younger sisters survived the genocide,
but her parents and the rest of her siblings were brutally murdered; they were hacked to pieces with machetes and stuffed into a
tank on the family's farm. Celine and her sister hid in the fields for
months until the genocide ended.
Eventually, Celine married a Hutu man who had not been involved with the genocide. She and her husband raised Celine's
12.
For example, in fiscal year 2010, the immigration courts nationwide completed adjudication in 40,545 asylum cases. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, u .S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK 12 (2011), availab/,e at http:/ /wwwJustice.gov/
eoir/statspub/fylOsyb.pdf. During calendar year 2010, the Board of Immigration Appeals
issued only 5 published decisions dealing with claims for asylum. See C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
341 (BIA 2010); X-M-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 322 (BIA 2010); B-Y.., 25 I. & N. Dec. 236 (BIA
2010); H-1.rH- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209 (BIA 2010); T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 193
(BIA 2010). Based on these numbers, only approximately .01 % of asylum claims will result
in a published BIA decision. While this is an imperfect comparison for multiple reasons, it
does illustrate the massive disparity between the number of asylum claims heard and decided and the number ofprecedential decisions in asylum claims issued over a year's time.
13.
Names and identifying details of the asylum seekers, as well as some aspects of the
asylum seekers' stories, discussed in this Article have been changed to protect their privacy.
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younger sister and her husband's child from a prior relationship as
their own children. Celine's experiences during the genocide had
a profound impact on her, and as a way of dealing with them she
became very involved with a number of different organizations to
support genocide survivors. She also joined an opposition political
party, in part because she was unhappy with the Rwandan government's policy towards the genocide survivors. Her husband, still a
member of the Rwandan army, was also a high level officer in a different party.
Celine and her husband had always had difficulties because of
their various activities and memberships, but their problems escalated upon Celine's return from a trip to the United States. When
one of Celine's genocide survivor organizations was given an award
in the United States, Celine was invited to attend a ceremony to
accept the award on behalf of the organization. Celine obtained a
visitor's visa, traveled to the United States, accepted the award, and
returned to Rwanda. After she returned from her trip, government
officials came to her home repeatedly to threaten and question her
and her husband. Celine's husband was arrested and disappeared.
Celine herself was arrested and detained for approximately two
weeks. During her detention, she was beaten, interrogated, and
otherwise mistreated. One of the blows to her head left her with
severely impaired vision. She was eventually released, but the government officials warned her that they would not leave her alone.
Terrified that such treatment would continue, Celine fled alone to
the United States, hoping that she would soon be able to bring her
stepdaughter and sister to join her.
Celine applied for asylum affirmatively in the United States as
soon as she was able. 14 The Asylum Office referred Celine's case to
Immigration Court, where Celine renewed her request for asylum
and also made requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge issued
a written decision some months after Celine's individual hearing.
He found Celine credible, and agreed that she had proven a wellfounded fear of persecution in Rwanda on account of multiple
protected grounds. However, he denied her asylum because he
speculated that she had not told the truth in obtaining the visa she
used to come to the United States to accept the award for the gen-

14.
Individuals who are not in removal proceedings apply for asylum affirmatively before United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, while individuals who are in
removal proceedings apply for asylum defensively before an immigration court. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.2, 1208.2 (2010).
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ocide survivor's organization, and granted her only withholding of
15
removal.
Withholding of removal was not an acceptable form of relief for
Celine. It meant that she would be unable to ever legally petition
for her stepdaughter and her sister to come to the United States to
join her. Even worse, it meant that she would probably never see
them again. Because of Celine's situation, it would be unlikely that
her stepdaughter and sister would be granted United States
16
nonimmigrant visas to come to visit her, and Celine could not
leave the United States to visit them in some safe third country
without executing the order of removal against her and risking being unable to return to the United States. Celine would be stuck in
limbo, able to remain in the United States only if the United States
government was unable to deport her to some country other than
Rwanda, but unable to apply for legal permanent residence or citizenship here.
Because of these very severe consequences, Celine chose to appeal the denial of asylum. While Celine's appeal was ultimately
successful, she did not receive a final decision until almost two and
half years after the immigration judge initially issued a decision.
During that time, Celine remained in the United States alone, separated from the only family she had left and struggling to support
herself without authorization to work. Unfortunately, Celine passed
away shortly after receiving the final decision in her case. Because
of the delay caused by the immigration judge's discretionary denial
of her claim to asylum, she was never able to bring her family to
the United States.

15.
Withholding of removal is a fear-based form of immigration relief-with a higher
standard of proof and fewer benefits than asylum-that is available to some who are barred
from asylum eligibility or denied asylum in an exercise of discretion. It results only in a relatively tenuous legal status with no direct opportunity to make that status more direct or
secure; an individual granted withholding is ordered removed but physical removal (deportation) to the country where the individual fears persecution is withheld. For a more
detailed discussion of withholding of removal, and the differences between withholding and
asylum, see infra text accompanying notes 42-53.
16.
Nonimmigrant visas typically require proof of intent to stay only temporarily in the
United States and to return to one's home country at the end of the period of authorized
stay. See INA§ 214(b); 8 U.S.C. § ll84(b) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 214.l (a) (3)(ii) (2010); 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.11 (2010). Celine's stepdaughter and sister would have a very difficult time as a practical matter proving their intent to return to Rwanda after a visit to the United States because
of Celine's presence in the United States as the result of a fear of persecution in Rwanda in
combination with Celine's uncertain legal status in the United States.
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2. Case Study Number Two: Yusef
17

Yusef, a native and citizen of Pakistan, had lived in the United
States for just under ten years at the time he was detained and
placed in removal proceedings. He was unable to bond out, 18 and
therefore he remained detained for approximately five months
while his proceedings were pending. Before his detention, Yusef
lived with his wife, a citizen of Pakistan and a legal permanent resident of the United States, and their two children (one a legal
permanent resident and one a United States citizen) in a town several hours away from the facility where he was detained. Yusef was a
member of a large family. His parents, who were Christian activists,
remained in Pakistan. At the time he was placed in removal proceedings, his mother was suffering from cancer. His siblings had
fled Pakistan because of the danger that they faced there and were
scattered in a number of different countries, including England,
Canada, and the United States.
Yusef himself had also been a Christian activist while in Pakistan.
He had experienced a number of problems and threats as a result
of his religion and work, and it was ultimately decided that he and
his wife needed to leave Pakistan for the United States for their
safety. While he lived in the United States, Yusef never applied for
asylum because he had always been able to maintain another legal
immigration status: he first entered as a nonimmigrant student and
subsequently adjusted his status to legal permanent residence
based on an employment opportunity. After he was placed in removal proceedings, though, he applied for asylum and withholding
of removal. Conditions for Christians and his family in Pakistan
had only worsened during the time he had spent in the United
States.
At the end of Yusef's individual hearing, the immigration judge
indicated that he found Yusef credible and believed that he had a
well-founded fear of future persecution in Pakistan on account of
his religion or his family ties. He said, however, that he would be
inclined to deny Yusef asylum in an exercise of his discretion because ofYusef's criminal history, 19 which was not serious enough to
17.
The names and identifying details of the asylum seekers, as well as some aspects of
the asylum seekers' stories, discussed in this Article have been changed to protect their privacy.
18. Some non-citizens detained during the pendency of their removal proceedings are eligible to be released from detention upon payment ofa bond or on their own recognizance.
See INA§ 236(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2) (2006). Others, like Yusef, are subject to mandatory detention and are not eligible to be released on bond except under limited, extreme
circumstances. See INA§ 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).
19.
Yusef had two convictions for financial crimes, but was sentenced only to probation
and did not serve any jail time.
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constitute a mandatory bar to asylum, and that if either party intended to file an appeal in the case he would need time to further
review the record and draft his decision. The attorney for the Department of Homeland Security said that he would not appeal a
grant of withholding of removal if Yusef agreed not to appeal a denial of asylum. Yusef, offered a certain way to stay in the United
States, albeit with limited benefits, versus additional, potentially
significant time in detention while an appeal was adjudicated with
an uncertain outcome, agreed to accept withholding of removal.
If Yusef had been granted asylum, he would have been able to
travel freely and eventually would have been eligible to apply again
for legal permanent residence or even citizenship. Because the
court granted him only withholding of removal, however, he may
never leave the United States without executing the order of removal against him. He will likely never be able to travel to visit his
siblings in Canada and England. More importantly, he was unable
to see his mother before she died of cancer after his individual
hearing because the United States was too far for her to travel and
he was unable to leave the United States to travel to a third country
closer to her.
Furthermore, Yusef will always face the potential risk of being
removed to some country other than Pakistan. Because this option
exists, Yusef has had to attend regular meetings with a deportation
officer and report his travel inside the United States. He could be
subjected to these check-ins for the rest of his life. His status in the
United States will always be precarious, and a potential hindrance
to his future life, but he will likely have no opportunity to regularize it. He cannot even seek a more secure status elsewhere without
giving up the right to return to the United States, the country
where one of his children was born and where he and his family
20
made their lives, without special permission.

3. Case Study Conclusions
In both of these cases, it is important to note that the respective
immigration judges found that it was more likely than not that Celine
and Yusef would be persecuted if forced to return to their home
20.
As required by l-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 433-34 (BIA 2008), the immigration
judge entered an order of removal against Yusef before granting withholding of removal. As
a result, it will probably be necessary for Yusef to convince the Department of Homeland
Security to join him in a joint motion to reopen his removal proceedings in order for him
ever to obtain any immigration benefit that he might become eligible for in the future. See
INA§ 240(c) (7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv) (2010).
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countries. That is, they met a factual burden many times higher
21
than they needed to in order to be eligible for asylum. Yet both
were nevertheless denied asylum in an exercise of the immigration
judges' discretion. Law and precedent did not mandate these outcomes; an adjudicator faced with these facts could have-and
possibly should have-easily reached the opposite outcome. As a
result of being denied asylum, Celine and Yusef faced extreme
consequences. While they were protected from persecution and
could legally work, Celine and Yusef did not and will not receive
any other benefits in the United States. They were separated from
family, their freedom of movement was restricted, and they will always have the threat of deportation from the country where they
have built a life hanging over them. Ultimately, they became a very
real form of second-class, long-term residents in the United States.

B. How Did Discretion Become an E/,ement in Asylum Eligibility?

"Asylum" as it exists today became a part of immigration law in
the United States with the Refugee Act of 1980. 22 While the history
of protection from persecution for immigrants to the United States
is somewhat lengthy, for purposes of this Article it is sufficient to
understand that the primary form of relief prior to 1980 for noncitizens within the United States who feared a return to their home
country was withholding of removal, which authorized the Attorney General to "withhold deportation of any alien within the
United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion." 23 Withholding of removal was understood to be
24
discretionary. The Refugee Act of 1980, intended to bring United
States law into compliance with our obligations under the 1951
25
Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
26
made withholding of removal mandatory.
21.
In order to be eligible for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate a one in ten
chance of future persecution; in order to be granted withholding of removal that same applicant must demonstrate that the likelihood of future persecution is greater than 50
percent. See infra text accompanying notes 43 and 50.
22.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-212, § 20l(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of8 U.S.C.).
See INA§ 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (2006).
23.
24.
SeeINSv. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 423n.18 (1984).
25.
See id. at 421-22; see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223.
26.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 95-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107; see also Stevie,
467 U.S. at 421.
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Article 33 of the 1951 Convention as amended and incorporated
by the 1967 Protocol provide that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member21
ship of a particular social group or political opinion. " This is
commonly known as the obligation of "non refoulement." Because,
before 1980, withholding of removal was both discretionary and
the only form of protection from return to persecution for individuals inside the United States, the United States was at least
potentially failing to comply with its non-refoulement obligation:
an individual denied withholding of removal in an exercise of the
adjudicator's discretion could be returned to a country where "his
life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the
protected grounds. 28 Withholding of removal was therefore made
mandatory by the Refugee Act of 1980 to conform to the obligation of non refoulement. 29
At the same time as withholding was made mandatory, a new
form of relief from removal to a country of persecution was created: asylum. The Refugee Act of 1980 added INA section 208 which
then, as now, provided that the Attorney General may grant asylum
to those meeting the definition of a refugee. 30 A "refugee" was defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that
27.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33,July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. l,Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
28.
Id. It is worth noting that the United States appears to have taken the position that
it was in compliance with Article 33 even before the Refugee Act of 1980. H.R. REP. No. 96608, at 17-18 (1979) ("Although this section has been held by court and administrative
decisions to accord to aliens the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels
it is desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention."). This was at least in part because administrative action took care of the apparent
discrepancy between the Refugee Convention and Protocol and the language of the INA; in
practice withholding of removal was not, or only rarely, denied in an exercise of discretion.
Stevie, 467 U.S. at 429 ("The Attorney General, however, could naturally accommodate the
Protocol simply by exercising his discretion to grant such relief in each case in which the
required showing was made, and hence no amendment of the existing statutory language
was necessary.").
29.
Stevie, 467 U.S. at 421 ("Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980 amended the
language of§ 243(h), basically conforming it to the language of Article 33 of the United
Nations Protocol.").
30.
Refugee Act of 1980 § 208.
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country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
31
a particular social group, or political opinion ....
Asylum was understood from its inception to be a nonmandatory form of relief. In fact, INA section 208 as enacted in
1980 was explicitly discretionary. It stated: "[A]n alien ... may be
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
32
General determines that such alien is a refugee .... " The
Supreme Court confirmed that this discretion meant more than
the power to decide whether an applicant was statutorily eligible
for asylum as early as 1984, stating in an aside in a footnote: "Meeting the definition of 'refugee,' however, does not entitle the alien
to asylum-the decision to grant a particular application rests in
33
the discretion of the Attorney General under§ 208 (a) ." The question of why asylum was created and understood as a discretionary
form of relief is slightly more complex, simply because there is little direct evidence of why Congress made this change.
The term "discretion" remained a part of section 208(a) of the
INA until 1996. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) passed that year enacted sweeping
changes to many different facets of immigration law, including
34
those dealing with asylum. Section 208 was fundamentally restructured and expanded. 35 In the process, the equivalent of 208(a) was
revised to read: "The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien . . . if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a
36
refugee within the meaning of section 101 (a) ( 42) (A)." The
phrase "in the discretion of the Attorney General" was removed
entirely from section 208.
While there is substantial literature discussing the changes made
37
by IIRIRA to immigration law generally and asylum law specifically,
this particular change appears to have been largely, if not entirely,

31.
INA§ 10l(a)(42)(a), 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(42)(A) (2006).
32.
Refugee Act of 1980 § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (l)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
33.
INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 423 n.18 (1984).
34.
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
See id. Notable other revisions include the adoption of a one year filing deadline
35.
for asylum claims and the enactment of an expedited removal procedure that affected asylum seekers arriving at the borders of the United States. See id.
36.
IIRIRA, § 208(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l) (1996). The language of INA
§ 208(b) (1) remains substantially the same today, differing only in the addition of references to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See INA§ 208(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)
(2006).
37.
See, e.g., SCHRAG, supra note 1.
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overlooked. If observed in isolation as a textual interpretation
question, this might appear to be a significant change, one that
Congress intended to redefine the role of discretion in an asylum
case or even to diminish its importance. Viewed in the context of
the overwhelmingly more restrictive changes made by IIRIRA and
38
other related 1996 laws, however, it is abundantly clear that Con39
gress did not intend to remove any barriers for asylum seekers.
The removal of this phrase may have been an oversight. It is more
likely, however, that the phrase was removed as superfluous, as the
statute still states that the adjudicator may, not must, grant asylum
to eligible refugees. This interpretation is supported by the fact
that the section of the INA dealing with judicial review of asylum
claims still refers to "the Attorney General's discretionary judgment
40
whether to grant relief under section 208(a)."
Asylum today is still viewed as a discretionary form of relief,
41
while withholding of removal is mandatory relief. There do not
appear to be any publicly available cases, treatises, or law review
articles that challenge or discuss this discretionaryI mandatory distinction as a bedrock assumption of asylum law. There are also,
however, other important differences between asylum and withholding of removal.
Asylum is still available to those who meet the definition of a
refugee, that is, those who have suffered past persecution or who
have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of one
42
of the five protected grounds. The Supreme Court has held that a
one in ten chance of future persecution is enough to demonstrate
43
that a fear of persecution is well-founded. An individual granted
44
asylum is given permanent legal status in the United States. Such
individuals may apply immediately to bring spouses and minor

38.
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. Law 104208, 110 Stat. 3009 (I996). These changes included the creation of the one year filing deadline for asylum seekers and the application of expedited removal procedures to individuals
seeking asylum at the borders of the United States. Id. at§§ 604, 302.
See, e.g., SCHRAG, supra note 1, at 225-39.
39.
INA§ 242(b) (4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (D) (2006); see also Huang v. INS, 436
40.
F.3d 89, 97 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006).
See, e.g., GORDON ET AL., supra note 8, at§ 34.02(12) (d); IRA]. KURZBAN, IMMIGRA41.
TION LAw SouRCEBOOK Ch. 4, §§ III.F, IV (12th ed. 2010).
42.
SeeINA § 208(b)(l)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(A) (2006); see also INA§ 101 (a)(42)(A),
8 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(42)(A) (2006).
43.
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439-40 (1987).
44.
See INA§ 208(c) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (l)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. 208.l4(e) (2010)
("If the applicant is granted asylum, the grant will be effective for an indefinitely period, subject to termination as provided for in 208.24."). But cf. 8 U.S.C. ll58(c)(2) (2006) (allowing
the Attorney General to act to terminate asylum status if certain conditions are met).
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45
children to join them as derivative asylees in the United States,
46
they may work legally in the United States, they may travel into
and out of the United States with the permission of the government,47 and they will eventually be eligible to apply for permanent
48
legal residence and United States citizenship.
Individuals who are not granted asylum but who demonstrate
that their "li[ves] or freedom would be threatened" in their country on account of one of the five protected grounds are granted
49
withholding of removal. The Supreme Court has held that "would
be threatened" means a clear probability, or a greater than 50 per50
cent chance, of future persecution. Withholding of removal
prevents foreign nationals from being sent back to the country
51
where they would be persecuted and allows them to work legally
52
while in the United States; however, it comes with few other benefits. Unlike an asylee, an individual granted withholding of removal
has an order of removal against him or her53 and therefore cannot
easily travel outside the United States, cannot apply to bring family
members to the United States, and is not entitled to apply for legal
permanent residency or United States citizenship.
Both the Department of Justice (DOJ), under the direction of
the Attorney General, and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
54
are responsible for adjudicating asylum applications. USCIS, within DHS, hears and makes discretionary determinations on
affirmative asylum applications, that is, applications filed by individuals who are not in removal proceedings. 55 Asylum officers
45.
See INA§ 208(b) (3) (A), 8U.S.C.§l158(b) (3) (A) (2006).
46.
INA§ 208(c) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(l) (B) (2006).
47.
INA§ 208(c)(l) (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(l) (C) (2006). An asylee may not, however,
be able to travel back to her country of persecution. See INA § 208(c)(2) (D), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(c) (2)(0) (2006).
48.
See INA§ 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2006); INA§ 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006).
49.
INA § 241 (b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (2006). While the INA today calls this
form of relief "restriction on removal," it is more commonly known as withholding or withholding of removal because of its history. See, e.g., GORDON ET AL., supra note 8, at
§ 34.03(1). There are reasons other than a discretionary denial of asylum that an individual
might be granted withholding of removal in the alternative, including the one year filing
deadline, INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006), the particularly serious
crime bar due to conviction of an aggravated felony with a sentence of less than five years,
INA § 208(b) (2) (B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (B)(i) (2006), or one of the other bars to
relief applicable to asylum but not to withholding of removal.
50.
See INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 429-30 (1984).
51.
INA§ 241 (b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (2006).
52.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(l0) (2010).
53.
See I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432 (BIA 2008).
54.
INA§ 208(b) (1) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(A) (2006).
55.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.2, 208.14(b) (2010).
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within USCIS have the power to grant asylum applications, and
they may deny applications only for individuals still in some legal
immigration status. If they do not want to grant asylum to an individual who is not in a valid immigration status, they do not deny
the application but instead refer that individual to the immigration
courts, where he will have another opportunity to present his claim
for asylum. 56 Immigration judges, within DOJ, hear these referred
asylum claims as well as defensive asylum applications raised by in57
dividuals for the first time in removal proceedings. There is no
appeal of an Asylum officer's decision other than renewing the
58
claim for asylum before an immigration judge. Adverse immigration judge decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration
59
Appeals (BIA), and ultimately to the federal circuit court with jurisdiction over the place where the proceedings before the
60
immigration judge took place.
The standard of review is quite different at the various levels. An
immigration judge is not bound by an asylum officer's discretionary determination. The BIA reviews an immigration judge's
61
discretionary determination de novo. The ability to review discretionary determinations at the administrative level, then, is quite
broad and unconstrained by deference to the adjudicator at the
level below.
Review of discretionary determinations at the circuit court level,
on the other hand, is extremely deferential. The INA states that
the Attorney General's discretionary decision in asylum claims
"shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an
62
abuse of discretion. " Abuse of discretion is one of the most defer63
ential standards of review a circuit court may apply. It has been
defined in this context as action by the BIA that is "arbitrary, irra64
tional, or contrary to law. " In practice, the circuits struggle with
65
what this standard means and apply it somewhat inconsistently. 66
56.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c)(l), 1208.14(c)(l)(2010).
57.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(b) (2010).
58.
See8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c), 1208.14(c) (2010).
59.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(b)(9) (2010).
60.
INA§ 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-43 (2006).
61.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (d) (3)(ii); Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 873 (BIA 1994).
62.
INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006); see also, e.g., Zuh v.
Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2008); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 541 (6th
Cir. 2007).
63.
6-51 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§ 51.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2011).
64.
Kouljinski, 505 F.3d at 541 (citing Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 288 (6th Cir.
2005)).
65.
See, e.g., Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 96-97 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006).
66.
Compare, e.g., Kouljinski, 505 F.3d at 541-43 (considering only whether two particular discretionary factors considered by the immigration judge and the BIA were permissible
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They are as a whole, however, relatively reluctant to overturn dis67
cretionary determinations made by the executive branch.
Discretionary determinations in asylum claims remain one of the
few discretionary determinations that are reviewable at the circuit
court level at all. As part of the IIRIRA, Congress removed jurisdiction from the federal courts to review:
[A]ny judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245, or any other decision
or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this
title to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
68
Secretary of Homeland Security ....
The INA sections referenced by Congress include most forms of
discretionary relief other than fear-based relief available in removal
proceedings: certain waivers of inadmissibility, all types of cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status. It is
likely that jurisdiction stripping informs the circuit courts' application of the abuse of discretion standard as it applies to
discretionary determinations in asylum claims, causing them to be
even more deferential than this already extreme standard of deference would otherwise demand.
Asylum officers are delegated their authority to adjudicate asylum claims by the Secretary of Homeland Security, while
immigration judges are delegated their authority by the Attorney
General. Therefore, each could receive separate and potentially
distinct instructions on what discretion means in this context and
how to exercise it. Despite this risk, as discussed in more detail be69
low, both agencies apply the same basic standard. As neither DOJ
factors) with Zuh, 547 F.3d at 510-12 (setting out a list of discretionary factors for adjudicators to consider and emphasizing the immigration judge's failure to balance the positive and
negative factors that existed in the case).
CJ, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 507-08, 513 (explaining the infrequency with which cir67.
cuit courts overturn a discretionary denial of asylum but in fact reversing and remanding
such a denial). Note, however, that Zuh likely overstates the rarity of discretionary denials as
it appears to rely only on published Board of Immigration Appeals decisions and publically
available circuit court decisions, which together represent only a small percentage of total
immigration cases, in its analysis. Id.
68.
INA§ 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006).
69.
This may be at least in part a function of the history of the administrative structure
of the relevant agencies. Up until 2003, the only relevant agency was the DOJ under the
direction of the Attorney General. Prior to 1983, there was a single agency \\~thin the DOJ
responsible for immigration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service or INS. See Fed.
Reg. 9115 (Nov. 26, 1958). The INS contained immigration judges responsible for adjudicating deportation cases, officers responsible for awarding immigration benefits to those who
applied affirmatively, and officers charged with enforcing the federal immigration laws. Id.
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nor DHS has clarified standards by issuing regulations for this exercise of discretion in asylum cases, the standard is elucidated only
in internal agency memoranda and manuals, publicly available deci71
70
sions of the agencies, and decisions of the federal circuit courts.

C. What Does "Discretion" Mean Today in the
Context of an Asylum Case?

1. The Basic Application of Discretion
The mere fact that asylum remains unquestioningly discretionary does not answer the questions what it means for an adjudicator
to exercise that discretion and when and how it is exercised. The
most straightforward explanation is that, once an adjudicator has
determined that an applicant meets all requirements to be statutorily eligible for asylum, an adjudicator must then decide whether,
72
in an exercise of his or her discretion, to grant that form of relief.
The reverse is not true-an adjudicator cannot grant asylum to an
73
applicant who is for any reason not statutorily eligible.
In 1983, a separate agency was created within DOJ to house the adjudication functions: the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, or EOIR, which was comprised of the immigration
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Immigration Review Function; Editorial
Amendments, 48 Fed. Reg. 8038 (Feb. 25, 1983). Both EOIR and the INS remained under
the direction ofDOJ and the Attorney General until 2003. In 2003, in response in significant
part to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Homeland Security Act created the
Department of Homeland Security under the Secretary of Homeland Security. Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat. 2135, 2142. The effective date of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was sixty days after enactment, or January 24, 2003. Id.
The INS was abolished, and its functions were for the most part shifted to three separate
agencies within OHS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services or USCIS, responsible for affirmative immigration benefits; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and
Customs and Border Patrol. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, §§ 471 (abolishment of
INS), 451 (Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services), 442 (Bureau of Border Security), 411 (U.S. Customs Service), (codified respectively at 6 U.S.C. §§ 211, 271, 252); 8 C.F.R.
1.1 (x)-(z) (2011) (listing the current names of the agencies, which have been changed on
multiple occasions). EOIR, including the immigration judges, remained within DOJ. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2011).
70.
Because neither immigration judges nor asylum officers issue published or precedential decisions in individual cases, these are primarily decisions of the BIA.
USCIS also acknowledges that its asylum officers are bound by BIA and applicable
71.
circuit court decisions in making discretionary determinations on applications for asylum.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Sources of Authority, AsYLUM OFFICER BASIC
'TRAINING COURSE (2007); u .s. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, AsYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE (2009) [hereinafter Mandatory
Bars to Asylum and Discretion].
72.
See, e.g., GORDON ET AL., supra note 8, at§ 34.02(12) (d); KURZBAN, supra note 41,

at 519.
See generally, GoRDON ET AL, supra note 8, at§ 34.02(12) (d); KuRZBAN, supra note
73.
41, at 519; see also Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.

612

University of Michigan Journal of Law &form

[VoL. 45:3

Over time, a list of factors intended to guide this exercise of discretion has developed. The list of discretionary factors used today
stems from a series of BIA cases decided beginning early in the
74
1980's,just after the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted. A BIA case
75
from 1987, Pula, is the seminal case in this respect. With some
minor modifications and changes in emphasis, the list of factors
identified in Pula is still referenced by adjudicators in both USCIS 76
77
and EOIR, and Pula remains the most frequently cited case by the
7
federal circuit courts. s The factors listed in Pula, however, have
been fleshed out, and several additional considerations have been
added by subsequent agency case law and guidance. The basic discretionary factors considered today can be divided into two major
categories: factors related to immigration and asylum process and
procedures specifically, and factors related to the applicant's life
more generally.
Within the first category, adjudicators primarily focus on how
the applicant came to be in the United States and her conduct during the application process. Adjudicators also look to the
applicant's circumstances before coming to the United States, including whether the applicant passed through other countries on
79
the way to the United States, whether he or she could have found
safe haven in a third country.so and whether overseas refugee pro1
cedures were available to the applicant.s Adjudicators also focus

74.
See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987); Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA
1985); Shirdel, 191. & N. Dec. 33 (BIA 1984); Salim, 181. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982).
75.
Pula, 191. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).
76.
See Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
See, e.g., S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 2008).
77.
78.
See, e.g., Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009); Zuh v. Mukasey, 547
F.3d 504, 510 (4th Cir. 2008); Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2006);
Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 700, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006); Aden v. Ashcroft, 112 Fed. Appx.
852, 854 (3rd Cir. 2004); Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 1994).
79.
See, e.g., Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2007); Tandia v. Gonzales,
437 F.3d 245, 248-49 (2d Cir. 2006); Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2006);
Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (note that the regulations discussed no longer exist); Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004); Andriasan v.
INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042-47 (9th Cir. 1999); Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149, 154 (BIA 1990);
Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 105-07 (BIA 1989); Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 473; Gharadaghi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 311, 314-16 (BIA 1985).
80.
See, e.g., Gulla, 498 F.3d at 917-18; Tandia, 437 F.3d at 248-49; Alsagladi, 450 F.3d at
702; Mamouzian, 390 F.3d at 1138 (note that the regulations discussed no longer exist); Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1140; Andriasan, 180 F.3d at 1042-47; Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 105-07;
Pula, 191. & N. Dec. at 473, 474; Gharadaghi, 191. & N. Dec. at 314-16.
81.
See, e.g., Gulla, 498 F.3d at 917-18; Alsagladi, 450 F.3d at 702; Andriasan, 180 F.3d at
1042-47; Pula, 191.& N. Dec. at 473-74; Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 314-16; Shirdel, 191.
& N. Dec. 33, 37-39 (BIA 1984); Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
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on how the applicant entered the United States;82 if the applicant is
in removal proceedings, the nature and circumstances of the
83
charged grounds for removal; and any other violations of U.S.
immigration law. 84 Fraud is a major concern at all times, causing
adjudicators to scrutinize closely the nature and degree of any
fraud involved in the applicant's flight from persecution or entry
into the United States. 85 They also closely inspect the applicant's
level of candor with immigration officials through his or her entire
immigration history, including an actual adverse credibility finding
86
by an adjudicator at any point during the asylum process.
Within the second category, adjudicators take a broad focus,
looking at multiple facets of the applicant's life outside of the immigration and asylum process. Adjudicators consider an applicant's
87
ties to the United States, including how long the applicant has
88
lived here, whether he or she has family here and the immigra.
c:
·1y mem b ers, 89 an d community
.
. 90
t10n
status o f sue h iam1
ties.
Business and employment relationships and property ownership
are also relevant. 91 These ties to the United States are often
compared to the applicant's ties to third countries, that is,
82.
See, e.g., Li v. Holder, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18208, at *20-22 (9th Cir. Sep. 1,
2011); Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; Gulla, 498 F.3d at 916-17; Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 99-100 (2d
Cir. 2006); Alsagladi, 450 F.3d at 701-02; Mamouzian, 390 F.3d at 1138; Kasinga, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996); Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 107-08; Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474;
Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 314-16; Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315-16 (BIA 1982).
See, e.g., Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 35.
83.
See, e.g., Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2009); Aioub v. Mukasey,
84.
540 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2008); Ibrahim v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006);
Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 108; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 35.
85.
See, e.g., Alsagladi, 450 F.3d at 701-02; S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1337 (BIA 2000);
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 368; Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149, 154 (BIA 1990); Soleimani, 20 I.
& N. Dec. at 107; Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474; Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 314-16; Shirdel,
19 I. & N. Dec. at 37-39; Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 315-16; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
See, e.g., Kaur, 561 F.3d at 959-60, 961-62; Ibrahim, 434 F.3d at 1079; In reT-Z-, 24 I.
86.
& N. Dec. 163, 165 (BIA 2007); S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1337; Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
314-16; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 35.
See, e.g., Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 511 (4th Cir. 2008); Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
87.
473-74.
See, e.g., Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (BIA 1989) (discretionary grant noting that
88.
the respondent had lived in the United States for more than eight years); Mandatory Bars to
Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
89.
See, e.g., Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2007); A-H-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 774, 783 (AG 2005); Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 359; H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 347-48
(BIA 1996); lzatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 154; Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 108; Pula, 19 I. & N.
Dec. at 474; Gharadaghi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 314-16; Shirdel, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 37-39; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
90.
See, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474; Mandatory Bars to Asylum
and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
See, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1993);
91.
Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
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countries other than the United States and the country of feared
persecution. 92 As part of this analysis, adjudicators are directed to
consider evidence of hardship to the applicant and his or her family if deported to another country, or if denied asylum such that the
applicant cannot be reunited with family members in this country.93
In addition, adjudicators assess both positive and negative aspects
of an applicant's past conduct, considering good character, value,
94
and service to the community, proof of rehabilitation if the applicant has a criminal record, 95 the nature, recentness, and
96
97
seriousness of any criminal record, terrorist activities, and any
other behavior or evidence that indicates bad character or undesirability for permanent residence in the United States. 98 Finally,
humanitarian considerations such as age or health are also ger99
mane.
The discretionary determination is often treated as a balancing
test, with adjudicators weighing the positive factors against any
100
negative factors. Because asylum allows an individual to apply for
92.
See, e.g., Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 368; Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 154; Chen, 20 I. &
N. Dec. at 21; Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 108; Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 474--75.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) (2010); see also, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; Huang v. INS,
93.
436 F.3d 89, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2006); Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
2004); T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 165 (BIA 2007); Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion,
supra note 71, at 34.
See, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1993);
94.
Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
See, e.g., Dhine, 3 F.3d at 619-20; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note
95.
71, at 34.
96.
See, e.g., Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373, 385 (AG 2002) ("I am highly disinclined to exercise my discretion--except, again, in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving
national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of relief would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship-on behalf of dangerous or violent felons seeking asylum. As with applications for
adjustment of status, even a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship may be
inadequate to justify a grant of asylum, depending on the nature of the alien's crime."); Zuh,
547 F.3d at 511; Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2007); Tandia v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 245, 250 n.12 (2d Cir. 2006); Dhine, 3 F.3d at 619-20; T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at
165; Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682, 685 (BIA 1988); Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion,
supra note 71, at 35, 36.
See, e.g., Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2009); Kalubi, 364 F.3d at
97.
1139; S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 2008); A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 77, 782 (AG 2005);
McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 99-100 (BIA 1984); Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion,
supra note 71, at 35.
98.
See, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 511; A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 782-83; Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 35.
99.
See, e.g., Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1141; H-, 211. & N. Dec. 337, 347-48 (BIA 1996); Pula,
191. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987); Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at
34.
100. See Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34. See also, e.g., Zuh,
547 F.3d at 511; Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2007); Mamouzian v. Ashcroft,
390 F.3d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004); Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1139; Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357,
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legal permanent residence and, if granted residency, eventually for
U.S. citizenship, the question is sometimes posed as whether the
applicant is someone deserving of full rights and membership in
101
the community of the United States. The BIA has emphasized
that the facts should be weighed in favor of granting asylum, as
"the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the
102
most egregious of adverse factors." Although its interpretation of
what exactly constitutes a particularly egregious negative factor has
changed over time, 103 both the BIA and the federal courts have ad104
hered to this general principle, at least in name.

2. Other Interpretations of Discretion
This discussion of discretion in asylum cases, however, is somewhat oversimplified. While it is tempting to assert that
discretionary determinations in asylum cases are no more than a
straightforward weighing of factors unrelated to eligibility for asylum in the first instance, that is in fact not the case. The boundary
between substantive qualification and discretionary determination
has been blurred in at least two separate respects. First, there has
been some fluidity between what constitutes a discretionary factor
and what is instead an element of statutory eligibility. Second,
persecution, and particularly the degree of severity of the past
367-68 (BIA 1996) ("We have weighed the favorable and adverse factors and are satisfied
that discretion should be exercised in favor of the applicant."); Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec.
99, 108 (BIA 1989) ("Under the balancing analysis set forth in Matter of Pula, supra, the
Board finds that a grant of asylum is warranted as a matter of discretion."); Gharadaghi, 19 I.
& N. Dec. 311, 316 (BIA 1985) ("[W]e are unable to conclude that the applicant has established sufficient equities to outweigh the negative factors in the record."); Shirdel, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 33, 38 (BIA 1984) ("We have weighed all the equities .... "); A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at
782-83 (AG 2005).
101. See, e.g., A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 782-83 ("My view, based on a thorough review of
the record and considering the balance of factors discussed above, is that respondent is not
entitled to become a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Therefore, I deny
respondent's application for asylum in the exercise of my discretion.").
102. Pula, 191.&N.Dec.at474.
103. Compare, e.g., Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315-16 (BIA 1982) ("This Board finds that
the fraudulent avoidance of the orderly refugee procedures that this country has established
is an extremely adverse factor which can only be overcome with the most unusual showing of
countervailing equities.") with Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 473-74 ("[W]e agree with the applicant that Matter of Salim places too much emphasis on the circumvention of orderly
refugee procedures." (internal citation omitted)).
104. See, e.g., Zuh, 547 F.3d at 512-13; S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (BIA 2008) ("We also find that the respondent deserves a favorable exercise of discretion in the absence of any
notable adverse factors."); Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149, 154 (BIA 1990) ("As there are no
adverse factors in his record, we find ... that the applicant's asylum application should be
approved as a matter of discretion.").
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persecution, has explicitly been made a part of the discretionary
calculus.

a. Discretionary Factor or Element of Statutory Eligibility?
10-0

A number of factors-among them firm resettlement, safe ha106
ven in a third country, and conviction of a particularly serious
107
crime -have been considered part of both the statutory structure
governing eligibility for asylum and the discretionary analysis. Today, an individual may not be granted asylum if he or she "was
firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United
108
States." "Firmly resettled" is defined, with certain exceptions, as
"an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other
109
type of permanent resettlement." An individual further is not eligible for asylum if he or she may be removed, pursuant to a treaty,
110
to a "safe third country." This bar is of relatively narrow applicability because the United States has such a treaty only with Canada,
and even then the bar applies only under certain circumstances in
111
the absence of enumerated exceptions. Finally, an applicant is
barred from asylum if he or she, "having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to
112
the community of the United States." An aggravated felony is always a particularly serious crime for purposes of asylum
113
adjudications; whether or not other crimes (and which ones)
may also constitute particularly serious crimes differs between
•
•
114
circmts.
105. See INA§ 208(b) (2) (A) (vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2)(A) (vi) (2006).
106. See INA§ 208(a) (2) (A), 8U.S.C.§l158(a) (2) (A) (2006).
107. See INA§ 208(b) (2) (A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2)(A) (ii) (2006).
108. INA§ 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(c)(l), (2)(B) (2010).
109. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2010). An individual with such an offer is considered to be
firmly resettled unless (1) entry into the offering country was "a necessary consequence of
... flight from persecution," only "as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel," and
without the development of "significant ties" or (2) "the conditions of ... residence in that
country were ... substantially and consciously restricted." Id.
110. See INA§ 208(a) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (A) (2006).
111. See United States-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, U.S.-Can., Aug. 30, 2002,
State Dept. No. 05-35; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(6) (2010).
112. INA§ 208(b)(2) (A) (ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (ii) (2006).
113. INA§ 208(b)(2)(B) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (B) (i) (2006). Aggravated felony is a
term of an defined at INA§ 101 (a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § llOl(a) (43) (2006). Particularly serious
crime is defined differently for purposes of restriction on (withholding oO removal. See INA
§ 24l(b) (3) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3) (B) (2006).
114. Compare, e.g., Alaka v. Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that an offense must be an aggravated felony in order to be found a particularly serious
crime for purposes of the bar to withholding of removal) with Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 470
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The firm resettlement and particularly serious crimes bars have
been part of the regulations governing asylum adjudications since
115
as early as 1981. Before 1996, however, these regulations applied
only to the "district director," that is, adjudicators hearing affirma116
tive applications for asylum; they did not apply to immigration
judges hearing asylum applications in defense to exclusion or deportation.117 At the same time, firm resettlement and an applicant's
criminal history have consistently been part of the discretionary
analysis for asylum since the Refugee Act of 1980. Pula specifically
listed "the length of time the alien remained in a third country,
and his living conditions, safety, and potential for long-term resi118
dency there" in its first list of enumerated discretionary factors.
These particular factors were considered, for example, in Matter of
Soleimani, where the BIA analyzed the Iranian national respondent's
ties to Israel, but ultimately concluded that they did not warrant a
discretionary denial where she entered Israel on a nonimmigrant
visa, did not receive an offer of more permanent status, and did not
work or seek employment, but simply took language classes and re119
cuperated from pneumonia. Criminal convictions, likewise, were
frequently an important discretionary factor. In Matter of Gonzalez,
the BIA considered the respondent's two criminal convictions for
possession of heroin with intent to deliver. The BIA ultimately remanded the case to the immigration judge to hold an evidentiary

(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an offense need not be an aggravated felony in order to be
found a particularly serious crime that will bar withholding of removal); but see N-A-M-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 336, 337 (BIA 2007) (holding, subsequent to A/aka and Ali, that a crime need not
be an aggravated felony in order to bar withholding of removal as a particularly serious
crime). Note that separate statutory provisions, with slightly different language, create the
particularly serious crime bars for withholding of removal and for asylum and that the term
"particularly serious crime" is therefore sometimes interpreted differently depending on the
form of relief. Compare INA§ 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (for
purposes of asylum, "an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime."), with INA§ 241 (b) (3) (B), 8
U.S.C. § 123l(b)(3)(B) (2006). For purposes of withholding of removal, "an alien who has
been convicted of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced
to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall not preclude the Attorney
General from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime." See also, e.g., Gao v. Holder, 595 F.3d 549,
553-58 (4th Cir. 2010).
115. See8 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1981).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 191. & N. Dec. 682, 684 (BIA 1988).
118. Pula, 191. & N. Dec. 467, 474(BIA1987).
119. SeeSoleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 107-08 (BIA 1989).
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hearing for the purpose of considering those convictions in con120
junction with all other applicable discretionary factors.
All three of these bars-safe third country, firm resettlement,
and particularly serious crime-were incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act by IIRIRA in 1996. 121 Simultaneously,
they were made to apply to all adjudicators hearing asylum applications, both those hearing applications affirmatively and those
hearing applications in what would now be called removal pro122
ceedings. Even after these factors became statutory bars to
asylum in all instances, however, an applicant's life or potential life
in a third country and an applicant's criminal history continued to
be considered as part of the discretionary determination. In Matter
of Kasinga, the BIA weighed the nature of the respondent's flight
through Ghana and Germany to escape persecution in Togo before arriving in the United States as part of its weighing of the
"favorable and adverse" discretionary factors in the case. 123 In Matter of T-Z-, the respondent's "record of arrest and conviction in the
United States" was considered as part of the discretionary analy•

SIS.

124

While these "converted" factors may play a reduced role today in
the discretionary part of an asylum determination as a result of
their incorporation into statutory eligibility, the fact that they play
any role at all points to a substantial overlap between statutory and
120. Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 685-86 (remanding because "[t]he nature and gravity
of the conviction may militate heavily against an applicant for asylum, and in cases may ultimately be the determinative factor, but it is not the only evidence that should be received
and considered by an immigration judge or this Board in evaluating whether an otherwise
eligible applicant warrants a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion.").
121. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009, 691-92 (1996). For opaque reasons, these three bars were incorporated
in two different subsections of the INA, § 208(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2) (2006), and
§ 208(b) (2), 8 u.s.c. § 1158(b) (2) (2006).
122. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009, 592-94 (1996). Among its many other changes, IIRIRA also combined exclusion (for those seeking admission into the United States) and deportation (for
those the government was trying to deport from the United States) into a single form of
proceedings that it named removal proceedings. Id. at§ 392, 110 Stat. at 589.
123. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367-68 (BIA 1996); see also, e.g., Gulla v. Gonzales,
498 F.3d 911, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the nature and circumstances of Gulla's
time in Turkey, Greece, and Mexico during his flight to the United States and balancing
those details against the other discretionary factors present in Gulla's case).
124. SeeT-Z-, 241. & N. Dec. 163, 165, 176 (BIA 2007) (remanding in part for the immigration judge to consider the effect of a discretionary denial on the respondent's ability to
reunite with his wife and minor child without discussing the adverse factors relied on by the
immigration iudge, including the nature of the respondent's criminal record, in detail). See
also, e.g., Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that it was appropriate for the immigration judge to consider Kouljinski's three convictions for driving under
the influence in denying his application for asylum in an exercise of discretion).
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discretionary requirements. This overlap requires reflection on the
rationale for imposing a separate discretionary determination once
an applicant has demonstrated statutory eligibility for asylum. That
factors can move back and forth between categories, and that they
can be simultaneously considered as part of both statutory eligibility and discretionary determination, highlights that the term
"discretion" has little inherent meaning and only a very loose and
fluid definition.
Furthermore, the choice to label a decision as discretionary rather than one of statutory eligibility allows an adjudicator to avoid
making more precise, and likely more difficult, statutory determinations. In fact, the Attorney General has specifically used this
125
overlap to avoid making a statutory determination. In considering the case of a Haitian woman, Melanie Beaucejour Jean, with a
New York second degree manslaughter conviction, he stated:
Ultimately, however, it is unnecessary for me to resolve whether the respondent's conviction constitutes a "crime of
violence" or whether she has otherwise satisfied the eligibility
standards for asylum. Even assuming that the respondent not
only qualifies as a "refugee," but that her criminal conviction
does not preclude her eligibility, she is manifestly unfit for a
126
discretionary grant of relief.
Precise statutory determinations lead to more reliable standards
and greater predictability of outcome. In cases where the applicant
must decide whether or not to proceed at potentially great risk to
her and where the outcome-in some cases life or death-is of
such great consequence to the applicant, the difficulties of uncertainty are magnified.

125. It is relatively unusual for the Attorney General to issue a decision in a case in removal proceedings. As discussed above, a case is typically heard by an immigration judge,
with appeal first to the BIA and subsequently to the circuit court for the circuit in which the
initial immigration judge was physically located. However, the Attorney General is allowed to
direct a case be certified to himself at will pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(h)(l)(i) (2010). In the
case to be discussed, "a BIA panel declared that the respondent's conviction for seconddegree manslaughter did not render her ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal,
and that the likely hardship her family would endure if she were returned to Haiti merited
adjusting her status from refugee to lawful permanent resident." Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373,
374 (AG 2002). The Attorney General certified the case to himself to reverse the BIA on
both counts, and to make the larger point that "dangerous or violent felons" should be
granted relief from removal only in the most exceptional circumstances. Id. at 374, 383-84,
385.
126. Id. at 385 (emphasis in the original). This decision was issued during the tenure of
Attorney General John Ashcroft.
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Also concerning is the fact that labeling a decision discretionary
results in a more deferential standard of review. The question that
the Attorney General was avoiding, whether Ms. Jean's conviction
was an aggravated felony crime of violence and therefore a per se
particularly serious crime and a mandatory bar to asylum, is a question of law. Legal determinations are reviewed de novo by the circuit
courts, rather than for abuse of discretion like discretionary
127
determinations. By denying Ms.Jean asylum in an exercise of his
discretion, rather than as a matter of statutory eligibility, the Attorney General made it more likely that his decision in this particular
128
case would withstand scrutiny if appealed.

b. Past Persecution as Part of the Discretionary Analysis

The second respect in which the boundary between substantive
qualification and discretionary determination has been blurred is
that persecution has explicitly been made a part of the discretionary calculus in at least two different ways. First, as early as its
decision in Pula, the BIA has held that "the danger of persecution
should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse
factors," particularly where "an alien ... has established his statutory eligibility for asylum but cannot meet the higher burden
129
required for withholding of deportation." users still echoes this
guidance in its Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, including in
its list of positive discretionary factors " [e ]vidence of severe past
persecution and/ or well-founded fear of future persecution, in-

127. SeeINA § 242(a)(2) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (D) (2006); see also Mai v. Gonzales,
473 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 2006). Of course circuit court review of administrative interpretations of law is not purely de novo because it is subject to the principles of deference
articulated in Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but the de novo standard of
review is clearly less deferential than an abuse of discretion standard. Courts of appeals have
and exercise greater freedom to review legal determinations than discretionary ones.
128. Ms. Jean's case was appealed. Although it was caught in some procedural wrinkles
because of jurisdictional changes made by the Real ID Act, it was eventually heard as a petition for review by the Fifth Circuit. See Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2006). There
is no substantive discussion of the Attorney General's discretionary denial of asylum in the
Fifth Circuit's decision. There is some ambiguity in the decision, but the failure to discuss
the discretionary denial of asylum may be because Ms. Jean abandoned that claim. Id. at 394
("Jean raised several arguments in her original habeas petition; however, she maintains only
her ultra vires claim on this appeal."); contra id. ("Second, she argued that the Attorney
General's decision effectively rewrote the 'aggravated felony' asylum limits of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158, establishing a per se rule in place of Congress's guided discretion.").
129. Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987); see also Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367
(BIA 1996).
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eluding consideration of other relief granted or denied the applicant. "130
Second, individuals who have suffered particularly severe past
persecution may be granted asylum "in the exercise of discretion"
131
even in the absence of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
This second method of incorporating persecution into the discretionary analysis requires a bit more explanation because it
represents a departure from the weighing of positive and negative
factors previously discussed and a different way of viewing what it
means to make a discretionary determination in an asylum case.
The statutory definition of a refugee makes both those who suffered past persecution and those who have a well-founded fear of
132
future persecution eligible for asylum. The regulations implementing this statute, however, provide that an applicant who has
suffered past persecution but cannot demonstrate a danger of future persecution may be granted asylum only if the harm suffered
in the past was particularly severe or the applicant faces a risk of
133
other serious harm if returned to her home country. The BIA has
explained its rationale for granting asylum to those who have suffered severe persecution in the past as follows:
[T] here may be cases where the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for humanitarian reasons even if there is
little likelihood of future persecution .... "It is frequently
recognized that a person who-or whose family-has suffered
under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected
to repatriate. Even though there may have been a change of
regime in his country, this may not always produce a complete
change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of his
past experiences, in the mind of the refugee." ... Thus, while
the likelihood of future persecution is a factor to consider in
exercising discretion in cases where an asylum application is
based on past persecution, asylum may in some situations be
134
granted where there is little threat of future persecution.

130. Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 34.
131. Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 21 (BIA 1989). A grant of asylum under such circumstances is also sometimes described as "humanitarian asylum." See, e.g., Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355
F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004); S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 241. & N. Dec. 464, 464 n.l (BIA 2008).
132. INA§ 10l(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § ll0l(a)(42)(A) (2006); INA§ 208(b)(l)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(A) (2006).
133. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(l)(i), (iii) (2010); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(l)(i), (iii) (2010).
134. Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 19 (quoting Office of the United National High Commissioner for Refugees, THE HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
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This rationale has been used to grant asylum to, for example, a
Chinese national from a prominent Christian family that was tor135
tured for years during China's Cultural Revolution; an Afghan
national from a family that was believed to be assisting the mujahidin and who was personally detained, interrogated, and tortured
by the communist-supported Afghan government for more than a
136
year prior to the time that the mujahidin took power; and a Somali mother and daughter who both suffered severe complications
from atrocious forms of female genital mutilation. 137 On the other
hand, the month-long detention and beating of a different Afghan
national whose father was disappeared and likely killed by the
communist-supported Afghan government for the family's support
of a local mujahidin faction was found not to rise to the necessary
level of severity given "the degree of harm suffered by the applicant, the length of time over which the harm was inflicted, and the
lack of evidence of severe psychological trauma stemming from the
harm." 138
USCIS (the Department of Homeland Security) has not explicitly recognized that this constitutes a different interpretation of
discretion. In fact, the Asylum Officer Basic Training Course describes "a reasonable possibility of future persecution" as a positive
factor weighing "heavily in favor of exercising discretion to grant
asylum," while a "finding that there is no reasonable possibility of
future persecution (no well-founded fear) is a heavy adverse factor."139 Circuit courts appear, for the most part, to follow USCIS's
140
approach. The BIA (the Department of Justice) has been more
141
inconsistent in its treatment of this type of a determination. In
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES § 136 (Geneva, 1979)).
135. Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 16.
136. B-, Interim Dec.# 3251 (BIA May 19, 1995). Note, however, that the Board in this
case did not describe their decision as a discretionary one.
137. S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 2008); see also A-T-, 25 1. & N. Dec. 4, 6
n.l (BIA 2009).
138. N-M-A-, 221. & N. Dec. 312, 325-26 (BIA 1998).
139. Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71, at 35.
140. See, e.g., Xiu Qin Wang v. Holder, 391 Fed. Appx. 976, 977-78 (2d Cir. 2010) (stating that the agency should consider the danger of future persecution as a mitigating factor);
Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 512-13 (4th Cir. 2008); Vata v. Gonzales, 243 Fed. Appx. 930,
940 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the danger of persecution should typically outweigh all but
the worst adverse factors); Aden v. Ashcroft, 112 Fed. Appx. 852, 854 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating
that the danger of persecution should typically outweigh all but the worst adverse factors);
Mirmehdi v. Mukasey, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1995, at *5 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
likelihood of future persecution is a particularly important factor to consider).
141. Compare, e.g., H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 336, 347-48 (BIA 1996) (treating severe past persecution as one of many positive discretionary factors, albeit a particularly important one)
with N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 325, n.7 (BIA 1998) (stating that the determination of
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the case in which it considered this rationale in the greatest detail,
however, and where its determination on the issue was most central
to its decision, it was clear that the determination of "whether the
applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons arising out of the
severity of his past persecution for being unable or unwilling to re142
turn to Afghanistan" -and therefore the determination of
whether to grant the applicant asylum based on his past persecution
alone-should be made prior to and separately from consideration
of the other discretionary factors enumerated in its prior case law:
We recognized in Matter of H, supra, that there are a variety of
discretionary factors, independent of the circumstances that
led to the applicant's refugee status, such as his age, health, or
family ties, which are relevant to the ultimate exercise of discretion. Contrary to the arguments of the applicant's claim in
his motion and on appeal, under the current regulations,
these factors bear on the exercise of discretion in past persecution cases where a well-founded fear of persecution is
presumed to exist because country conditions have not been
shown to have changed or in cases where the "compelling reasons" requirement has been satisfied. Such factors, however,
are not relevant in assessing whether the "compelling reasons"
standard itself has been met, unless they are shown in some
143
respects to arise from the past persecution.
Not only, then, is it possible to define discretion within the context of asylum claims in many different ways, but various
adjudicators do define it differently. Furthermore, they are apparently not even aware that they are doing so, as there is no
discussion of these multiple interpretations in any published case.
Again, this increases potential discrepancies in decisions and uncertainty for applicants.

3. The All-Encompassing Nature of Discretionary Determinations
It should be clear by this point that discretionary determinations
in asylum claims are all encompassing: virtually anything is a permissible factor. In fact, adjudicators are directed to view these
whether there were "compelling reasons arising out of the severity of ... past persecution
for being unable or unwilling to return" to the applicant's home country should be made
before and separately from consideration of the other discretiona1y factors).
142. N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 325.
143. Id. at 325.
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determinations broadly. The BIA in Pula said that adjudicators
144
should consider "the totality of the circumstances." Circuit courts
have criticized immigration judges and the BIA for their failure to
follow this directive. 145 The Fourth Circuit, the one court of appeals
that has most explicitly developed its own list of factors (heavily
drawn from Pula 146 and the Asylum Officer Basic Training
. d t h at its
. l'ist is
. "non-ex h aust1ve.
. ,,148
Course 147) , h as emp h as1ze
The fact that an immigration judge can consider essentially anything he wishes in making a discretionary determination in an
asylum claim is a problem from a practical perspective. Such discretion makes it difficult to anticipate, gather, and present the
necessary evidence for applicants represented by counsel and even
149
more so for those asylum applicants who must appear pro se. It is
also a problem for two additional structural, policy-based reasons.
First, recent studies have already demonstrated that the outcome
in an asylum claim is highly dependent on particular characteris150
tics of the adjudicator assigned to the case. Allowing adjudicators
to freely consider such broad ranging discretionary factors only
increases these discrepancies in outcome, making it more likely
that the very same applicant could face a different outcome depending on which asylum officer or immigration judge she appears
before. Second, allowing discretionary factors to be outcome
determinative represents a move away from what should be at the
heart of refugee law: protection of those whose own country cannot or will not protect them.

II.

THE PROBLEMS OF MAKING ASYLUM DISCRETIONARY

In addition to the issues highlighted above arising out of allowing asylum determinations to be discretionary, asylum should not
be discretionary for three separate reasons. First, it is unnecessary
to include these factors as a check at this stage in the immigration
process. Second, allowing discretionary denials of asylum results in
insufficient relief for those genuinely in fear for their lives and

144. Pula, 19 l. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (BIA 1987).
145. See, e.g., Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 513, 515 (4th Cir. 2008).
146. Pula, 19 I. &N. Dec. at473-74.
147. Mandatory Bars to Asylum and Discretion, supra note 71.
148. Zuh, 547 F.3d at 510.
149. There is no right to government-provided counsel in immigration proceedings,
and some non-citizens are therefore unable to secure representation. INA§ 240(b) (4) (A), 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006).
150. See RAMJI-NOGALES, supra note 11.
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safety. Finally, the term discretion is so malleable and indeterminate that its use is inappropriate in the asylum context.

A. It Is Unnecessary to Include Discretion as
a Check at the Asylum Stage

Because asylum is a route to legal permanent residency and ultimately United States citizenship, one frequently offered rationale
for the particular balancing of discretionary factors in any given
claim is whether the applicant merits permanent membership in
151
United States society. Determining who merits membership in a
society of course involves a number of value judgments. Setting
those judgments aside for the moment, however, and assuming
that immigration law today actually reflects how we would like to
form and define our society, applying the discretionary factors as
they currently exist is redundant. Virtually every negative discretionary factor is accounted for at one or more of the other stages
152
of the process towards becoming a United States citizen.
Becoming a legal permanent resident or a United States citizen
is not automatic for asylees. An asylee must apply and qualify for
153
both. For purposes of adjustment of status to legal permanent
residence, one requirement is that the applicant must not be inadmissible pursuant to section 212 of the Immigration and
154
Nationality Act. While a waiver of many grounds of inadmissibility is available to asylees, that waiver is not mandatory and requires
that the applicant demonstrate that waiving the provision is justified "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or
155
[because] it is otherwise in the public interest." For purposes of
naturalization, one requirement is that the applicant be of good
156
moral character. This requirement cannot be waived. Both discretionary factors related to immigration procedures and the
151. See, e.g., Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The Attorney General is
not obliged to shelter people from despotic persecution abroad so that they may enjoy lawful imprisonment in the United States.").
152. Because Pula and the subsequent cases state that asylum should be granted in the
absence of adverse discretionary factors, only the negative factors matter for the purposes of
this analysis. Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474(BIA1987).
153. See INA§ 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § ll59(b) (2006) (adjustment of status); INA §§ 316,
312, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1423 (2006) (naturalization).
154. See INA § 209(b) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (5) (2006); INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(2006).
155. INA§ 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (2006).
156. INA§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006). "Good moral character" is a legal term of
art, defined for purposes of naturalization at INA§ 101 (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (f) (2006), and 8
C.F.R. § 316.10 (2010).
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asylum process-and discretionary factors related to the applicant's
life outside of the immigration and asylum process-are covered by
the grounds of inadmissibility and good moral character. Furthermore, if an asylee somehow violates immigration laws at any point
during their time prior to becoming a citizen, they may be charged
with the relevant grounds of removability, placed in removal proceedings, and, if so ordered in those proceedings, deported from
157
the United States.
Examining some of the cases discussed in part I ( C) (I) above
where discretionary denials of asylum were at issue provides a useful
illustration of this fact. Within the first category, discretionary factors
related to immigration procedures and the asylum process, an applicant who has made a material misrepresentation or committed
fraud at any point during any part of his immigration processincluding his entry into the United States, his application for
asylum, and his application for any other immigration benefit-will
158
be inadmissible and may also be barred from demonstrating good
159
moral character.
For example, the respondent in Matter of
Gharadaghi, who attempted to enter the United States using a false
160
name with the assistance of a smuggler, would be at least inadmissible, as would the respondent in Alsagladi v. Gonzales, who entered
the United States using his own passport containing a nonimmigrant
visitor's visa but lied about his intent to stay pem1anently in obtain161
ing the visa and in entering the United States. Misrepresentations
to the immigration court regarding his use of an alias, where he
lived, and his work would render the respondent in Matter of T-Z162
inadmissible and unable to demonstrate good moral character.
The respondent in Ibrahim v. Gonzales would likely be inadmissible
for his initial failure to disclose his arrest and conviction for driving
with a suspended drivers license and giving a false identity to police,
163
all related to a drivers license in an assumed name.

157. INA§ 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006); INA§ 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2006).
158. INA§ 212(a) (6) (C), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a) (6) (C) (2006).
159. See INA§ 101(£)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(£)(6) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(vi)
(2010). The mandatory bar to good moral character applies only if false testimony is given; a
lack of good moral character may still be found even if the mandatory bar does not apply.
INA§ 101(£), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (£) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2) (2010).
160. 19 I. & N. Dec. 311, 314-16 (BIA 1985).
161. 450 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2006); INA§ 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)
(2006).
162. 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 165 (BIA 2007); INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (6)(C) (2006).
163. 434 F.3d 1074, 1077-79 (8th Cir. 2006); INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C) (2006).
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Applicants with previous immigration violations, such as fraudulent marriages, participation in smuggling undocumented
individuals into the country, or entries without inspection on multiple occasions or after prior removal orders or unlawful presence
164
in the United States, will also be inadmissible. For instance, the
respondent in Aioub v. Mukasey entered into a fraudulent marriage
for the purpose of obtaining legal immigration status. At the point
of his application for adjustment of status, he would be at least inadmissible for having made a material misrepresentation to obtain
an immigration benefit. 165 As another example, the female respondent in Kaur v. Holder was accused by the Department of
Homeland Security of smuggling her daughter and nephew into
the United States. If this were proven to be true, she would be inadmissible and barred from demonstrating good moral character
for purposes of naturalization because of her role in assisting oth166
ers in entering the country illegally. As discussed above, the
applicant's ties to third countries are now already part of the statutory eligibility requirements.
Within the second category, factors related to the applicant's life
more generally, many applicants with criminal records will be inadmissible and barred from demonstrating good moral character
167
regardless of rehabilitation. For example, the respondent in
Dhine v. Slattery would be inadmissible and unable to show good
moral character as a result of his several controlled substance con168
victions. Applicants who have engaged in or have ties to terrorist
169
activities will be likewise inadmissible. The involvement of the
respondent in Matter of McMullen in the Provisional Irish Republican Army's random violence against civilians would render him
110
inadmissible as well.
The only factor not explicitly accounted for, then, is whether the
applicant circumvented overseas refugee procedures. The BIA in
Pula minimized the importance of this factor, stating that alone it
171
was not enough to require outstanding "countervailing equities."

164.
(2010);
(2006).
165.
166.
167.
(2010);
168.
169.
170.
171.

INA§ 212(a) (6) (E), 8U.S.C.§l182(a) (6) (E) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 316.lO(b) (2) (viii)
INA§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2006); cf. INA§ 204(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)
Aioub v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 609, 610-12 (7th Cir. 2008).
Kaur v. Holder, 561F.3d957, 961 (9th Cir. 2009).
INA§ 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.lO(b)(l)(i)-(ii)
8 C.F.R. §§ 316.lO(b) (2) (i)-(iv) (2010).
Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1993).
INA§ 212(a) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (2006).
McMullen, 19 1. & N. Dec. 90, 99-100 (BIA 1984).
See Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 473 (BIA 1987).
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It is duplicative and excessive to include these kinds of checks at
both the front (asylum) and the back (permanent residence and
United States citizenship) ends of the process. Due to the nature of
asylum claims, the dire need of many asylum seekers for protection, and the government and private resources required to
present asylum claims, it would be better to include these factors
only at the latter part of the process, namely, applications for legal
permanent residency and United States citizenship.

B. Including Discretion &sults in Inadequate Protection
for Those Fleeing Persecution

Including discretion as an element in the asylum determination
results in inadequate protection in at least two ways for many who
172
are fleeing persecution. First, those like Mr. Kouljinski who face
between a 10 percent (the standard of proof for asylum) and a 50
percent (the standard of proof for withholding of removal) likelihood of future persecution are not eligible for withholding of
removal and will likely receive no protection whatsoever if denied
173
asylum on discretionary grounds. Such an applicant for asylum
will be ordered removed back to the country where he is in danger
and will face, by definition, at least a one in ten chance of suffering
serious harm or even death. The fact that it will be virtually impossible for an adjudicator to accurately predict the precise likelihood
of future events on the basis of the evidence available to most asylum seekers provides further support for a contention that this
kind of a distinction between asylum and withholding of removal is
ill founded.
For Mr. Kouljinski, this could mean essentially that the United
State government sentenced him to the death penalty in civil proceedings as punishment for three driving under the influence
convictions for which he had already paid a criminal penalty. When
the result is phrased in this manner, it sounds so extreme as to be
ridiculous. It is difficult to imagine that an immigration judge
would ever reach such a result, and therefore tempting to say that
there is no need to place external constraints on immigration
judges' and other adjudicators' discretion. Not only did the immigration judge reach this decision in Mr. Kouljinski's case, however,

172.
173.

See Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007); Introduction, supra.
Kouljinsk~

505 F.3d at 545.
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but the BIA and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed it. 1; 4
175
Similar results have been reached in other published cases.
Second, withholding of removal is not sufficient security for
those like Celine and Yusef who must be granted this form of relief
because their fear of future persecution is greater than 50 percent.
The realities of a grant of withholding of removal are harsh. Yusef
must live with the fear that he could be removed to any other
country besides Pakistan that will agree to accept him, deported
away from his wife, their two sons, and his sister, all of whom are
either legal permanent residents or United States citizens. He may
have to report regularly to an immigration officer and comply with
strict conditions on his release for an indefinite period of time, in
part so that the Department of Homeland Security can deport him
if it locates any other country that will accept him. If he leaves the
United States to see his brothers, who sought asylum in Canada, or
his father, who remained in Pakistan despite the danger, Yusef may
not be allowed to return or may suffer other immigration consequences. He will likely remain in this limbo-like status for the rest
of his life. Although he will be able to work, he cannot do much
else. It will be difficult if not impossible for him to take advantage
of any other immigration benefits that he may become eligible for
due to the removal order against him.
Even though Celine was eventually granted asylum, the delay
caused by the immigration judge's discretionary denial and the
resulting necessity of appeal to the BIA was very difficult for her.
During that period of time, she was unable to see her sister and
stepdaughter, much less bring them to the United States, and had
to live with the risk that, if her appeal were unsuccessful, she might
never see them again. Because during the appeal Celine's grant of
withholding of removal was not final and Celine was not eligible
for employment authorization during the pendency of her asylum
claim, Celine was not even able to work during this period of time.
It does not make sense as a humanitarian or as a practical matter
to tell an applicant that we believe they will more likely than not be
severely harmed, tortured, or even killed if they return to their own
country, and we understand that they will likely remain in the
United States permanently-but at the same time subject them to
these kinds of stringent limitations and insecurities. In addition,
this structure of granting and denying benefits as it is currently
implemented at least arguably violates the United States' obligation of non refoulement under international law because
174.
I 75.

/d.at537-38,545.
See, e.g., Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 619-20 (2d Cir. I 993).
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individuals are in fact returned to countries where their lives and
freedom are threatened on account of one of the five protected
grounds in the refugee definition.

C. ''Discretion" ls Inherently Vague
Upon first reading, the term "discretion" seems clear. In everyday English, it means that a decision maker has the power to
exercise his or her own judgment and conscience in making a particular decision. The word is frequently used to mean both the
"[f]reedom to act or judge on one's own" and the "[a]bility or
176
power to decide responsibly." Black's Law Dictionary incorporates both of these aspects into a more specific definition for a
legal context: "[a] public official's power or right to act in certain
circumstances according to personal judgment and conscience,
177
often in an official or representative capacity. " This definition has
particular importance in the administrative law context, where by
definition agencies are delegated specific powers and responsibilities in a limited arena such as immigration.
When one begins to analyze the application and implications of
"discretion" as applied in a particular area of law, however, its
meaning becomes much less clear. Other authors have written
about the problems inherent in the use of the term in immigration
law generally and thoughtfully, so those issues are only highlighted
here. 178 Courts and commentators struggle with what "discretion"
179
as a term in the immigration law context means. That is understandable, given the frequency with which the word discretion
appears in immigration law and the diversity of its usage. One
Third Circuit case counted no less than thirty-seven usages within
180
just one subchapter of the INA. Like asylum, many other forms of
relief from removal are discretionary: adjustment of status to legal
182
181
permanent residence, waivers of inadmissibility, all types of

176.
177.
178.

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2011).
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and
the "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 161 (2006); Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or
Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 413 (2002); Daniel
Kanstroom, Su77Vunding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration
Law, 71 TuL. L. REv. 703 (1997).
179. See, e.g., Alaka v. Attorney General, 456 F.3d 88, 95-96 (3d Cir. 2006).
180. Id. at 97 nn.16-17.
181. See INA§ 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006).
182. INA§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).
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cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure, to name a
few. To make things even more complicated, the standard of proof
and the relevant discretionary factors differ for each form of relief.
The breadth of and discrepancies within what discretion means
within the asylum context should be clear from the discussion above.
The "standard" construal is not the only possible understanding of
discretion even within the asylum context; this is not the only possible interpretation(s) of discretion that the executive agencies
charged with implementing asylum law could have adopted.
The standards for eligibility for asylum, in contrast to the familysponsored immigrant preference categories, for example, are
much less precisely defined in the statute and therefore subject to
much greater levels in interpretation. The word "may" in section
208 of the INA could be understood as simply awarding the power
to the agencies to flesh out the meaning of these statutory provisions and which non-citizens met them, as they saw fit.
Even assuming that "may," and therefore "discretion," mean
something in addition to the statutory eligibility standards, the executive agencies charged with their implementation could have
interpreted them differently than the status quo. At one extreme,
the agency heads could have delegated this power without any direction or limitation, leaving it up to each individual adjudicator to
apply her own judgment and values as she saw fit. At the other extreme, the agency heads could have delegated this power with
explicit instructions, for example directing all adjudicators that
asylum must be denied in an exercise of discretion if the applicant
has any criminal convictions.
The meaning of "discretion" is inherently vague, and discretion
therefore cannot be consistently and properly exercised in practice. This vagueness has been cabined to some extent in the asylum
context by the case law that has developed on the factors that adjudicators can and should consider in making their decisions on
discretion, but not to a degree that it is no longer problematic. At
its most straightforward level, this issue is evidenced by the fact that
different adjudicators, given identical facts, could easily and well
within the bounds of the law reach opposite discretionary determinations on whether or not to grant asylum. This is, of course,
not unique to this situation. There are many difficult, close questions of law and fact in virtually every area of the law on which
reasonable adjudicators can and do differ. It is, however, more
problematic when we consider that we are discussing whether an
183.
184.

INA§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
INA§ 2408, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).
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individual who is fully statutorily eligible for asylum on the basis of
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
should in fact be granted that benefit and when we take in to account the concrete and severe consequences discussed above of
not being granted asylum.

CONCLUSION

Courts and commentators have not questioned the designation
of asylum as a discretionary form of relief essentially since it was
introduced as a form of relief from removal by the Refugee Act of
1980. Despite this lack of controversy, however, there are significant problems with this designation and its implementation.
Problems with the interpretation of discretion in asylum claimsincluding the movement and overlap of factors between statutory
and discretionary, the full importation of severe past persecution
and the danger of future persecution into the discretionary standard, the inconsistent definitions of discretion, and the fact that
virtually anything can be considered as part of a discretionary determination-combine to make the term discretion virtually
meaningless. Even outside the asylum context, the concept of discretion suffers from problematic vagueness. Moreover, it is
unnecessary to make asylum discretionary at all as adverse discretionary factors are either already taken into account at some other
juncture in the immigration process or could be more precisely
imported into the determination of statutory eligibility for asylum.
Finally, the fact that asylum is discretionary provides insufficient
relief for those seeking protection from persecution on account of
a protected ground.
Asylum should therefore be mandatory like withholding of removal and the other forms of fear-based relief from removal, and
not discretionary. This would not negate the difference between
asylum and withholding of removal because it would still be necessary for those subject to one of the asylum-specific bars to
demonstrate that they meet the higher standard of proof for withholding of removal. 185 It would, on the other hand, remove the
problems with the designation of asylum as discretionary as discussed here.
This is a change that is unlikely to occur as a broad-based mandate from the Board of Immigration Appeals, the circuit courts, or
185. The problem that this also may result in inadequate protection for genuine refugees is beyond the scope of this Article.
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even the Supreme Court, given the breadth and depth of the existing case law holding that asylum is discretionary. The most
straightforward and secure way to make this change would be
through legislation passed by Congress, perhaps as part of more
186
comprehensive immigration reform. Legislation is not, however,
the only option. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice could promulgate regulations directing their adjudicators to
always exercise their discretion favorably to applicants who demonstrate statutory eligibility for asylum, or even simply reinterpreting
discretion in a more narrow, cabined respect.
In the absence of legislative or regulatory change, individual adjudicators could weigh the likelihood of future persecution so
heavily as to always, or virtually always, outweigh any negative factors present. If consistently coupled with a comprehensive
explanation of the problems with interpreting discretion more
freely, and undertaken by a sufficient number of adjudicators, such
individual decisions might eventually motivate more systemic
change, whether on a formal or a more informal basis. However,
even if a radical policy change never occurs, awareness of and attention to the problems articulated here by government
adjudicators should result in the application of greater care in discretionary determinations in asylum claims, and thereby make a
difference in the lives and safety of the individual human beings
like Mr. Kouljinski, Celine, and Yusef who seek refuge through asylum in the United States.

186.

This is relatively unlikely to occur given the current political climate.

